Mahmoud Elamin |

Research Economist


Mahmoud Elamin, Research Economist

Mahmoud Elamin is a research economist in the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. He is primarily interested in applied theory, game theory, financial economics, and banking. His current work focuses on credit rating agencies, reputation, and regulation.

Dr. Elamin has a PhD and an MA in economics from the University of Minnesota.

  • Fed Publications
Title Date Publication Author(s) Type

 

2014-22 ; Bill Bednar; Economic Commentary
Abstract: Banks have been steadily increasing their exposure to interest rate risk since the end of the financial crisis, though large and small banks are doing so in different ways. This Commentary examines the maturity structure of assets and liabilities to identify the underlying factors responsible for the rise in interest rate risk and the differences between large and small banks.

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2014-12 ; Bill Bednar; Economic Commentary
Abstract: Average interest rate risk in the banking system has been increasing since the end of the financial crisis and is almost back to its pre-recession level. But the increase has not occurred uniformly at large and small banks. At big banks, risk, while increasing, hasn't yet reached its pre-recession high. It's in small banks where we see a steep rise in interest rate risk. The big banks' exposure is being driven mainly by their liabilities. At small banks, it is coming from both their assets and liabilities.

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April, 2013 Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, working paper no. 13-06 ; Working Papers
Abstract: I show, under intuitive conditions on the risk-averse utility function, the nonoptimality of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) contract in the Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) environment. If marginal utility at zero is low enough, then Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)'s claim about the optimality of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) contract is true. When it is not, the optimal contract insures the patient depositor against a project default. The contract may exhibit risk-sharing with the impatient depositor. Unlike when Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)'s claim is correct, relative risk aversion greater than 1 does not necessarily make the optimal bank contract run-prone. I present a condition under which it is.

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October, 2012 Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, working paper no. 12-22 ; Working Papers
Abstract: This paper identifies rating verifiability as a key difference that explains why credit rating agencies (CRAs) failed to mitigate information asymmetries in the structured finance market but succeeded in the bond market. Two infinitely repeated models are analyzed. In the first, the rating is unverifiable, and there is no equilibrium where the CRA reveals its information. In the second, the rating is verified with some probability, and full information revelation is guaranteed for any verification probability, when the CRA is patient enough. The interaction between verification probability and CRA patience is also analyzed.

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